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RESEARCH ARTICLE
The Logics of Public Authority: 
Understanding Power, Politics and Security 
in Afghanistan, 2002–2014
Marika Theros and Mary Kaldor
This paper applies the three logics of public authority – the political market-
place, moral populism and civicness – to the case of Afghanistan in 2001–2013. 
It shows how the logic of the political marketplace offers an apt interpretation 
of the Karzai regime, while the logic of moral populism is more relevant as a way 
of categorizing the Taliban. Based on a civil society dialogue project, the paper 
discusses the way that civil society actors characterize the situation and envisage 
a logic of civicness. The paper argues that the mutually reinforcing nature of the 
two dominant logics explains pervasive and rising insecurity that has been exacer-
bated by external interventions. The implication of the argument is that security 
requires a different logic of authority that could underpin legitimate and inclusive 
institutions.
Introduction
Since the overthrow of the Taliban regime 
in 2001, the international community has 
invested billions of dollars on security and 
reconstruction programs aimed at ending 
conflict and strengthening state legitimacy, 
yet both Afghanistan’s public authority and 
security landscapes have remained highly 
variegated and often fragmented at national 
and sub-national levels. By 2013, as President 
Karzai’s nearly ten-year presidential term 
was coming to an end, Afghan citizens had 
grown increasingly insecure and alienated by 
current political and security arrangements. 
Overall violence had doubled between 2011 
and 2012, while the reach of the Afghan 
state in administering justice had contracted 
considerably, even in areas where there 
was little presence of Taliban insurgents 
(Giustozzi 2012b).
This article makes two arguments. First, 
the international community has failed to 
consider the ways in which public authority 
functions in Afghanistan. Outside interven-
tion we suggest, especially large-scale aid 
provision, military largess and security prac-
tices have contributed to, and exacerbated, 
abusive neo-patrimonial power  relations and 
the manipulation of extremist Islamic nation-
alist narratives, leaving a legacy of pervasive 
insecurity. Second, there do exist social and 
political practices that could potentially pro-
vide the basis for legitimate forms of public 
authority that are a necessary condition for 
security but these practices have been mar-
ginalized and squeezed out by the dominant 
power relations  characterizing Afghan politi-
cal arrangements. The implication of this 
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argument is that security does not depend 
on the scale and nature of the security appa-
ratus; rather it is a function of social and 
political relations.
To develop these arguments, the article 
applies the conceptual framework developed 
in the Conflict Research Programme (CRP).1 
This framework focuses on the notion of 
public authority, which includes both the 
state and other forms of public authority 
above, beyond and below the state, and the 
way in which public authority functions. The 
framework articulates three logics of pub-
lic authority – the ‘political marketplace’, 
‘moral populism’ and ‘civicness’. The article 
shows how the system of state authority 
consolidated under President Karzai, widely 
described in neo-patrimonial terms, can be 
interpreted largely in terms of a political mar-
ketplace logic that pervades all levels, while 
the Taliban claim to authority and legitimacy 
has been primarily characterized by the logic 
of moral populism. The paper argues that the 
two logics are mutually reinforcing and that 
there are elements of the political market 
place to be found in the functioning of the 
Taliban and elements of moral populism in 
the way that the Karzai government framed 
its behaviour. Finally, the article draws on 
a research and dialogue project conducted 
between 2009–2011 that investigated 
Afghan experiences of political authority and 
their conceptions of civil society to explore 
civicness and what it implies for security.
The paper takes the case of Afghanistan 
from 2001 to 2013 – the period of Karzai’s 
administration – to illustrate the analytical 
value of these logics in different contexts 
beyond sub-Saharan Africa in understand-
ing the sources of security and insecurity, 
and offers an interpretation both of the 
complexity of conflict-torn spaces and the 
unanticipated consequences of international 
intervention. The first section provides a 
brief overview of the conceptual framework. 
We then discuss the dominant logics of the 
political marketplace and moral populism. 
The last section is about civicness.
Outlining the Logics of Public 
Authority
The term ‘public authority’ was developed as 
a way of moving beyond the dichotomy in 
the development studies literature between 
a preoccupation with failed, fragile, col-
lapsed or weak states on the one hand (OECD 
2013; Woodward 2004; Collier et al. 2003) 
and a newly emerging body of literature 
that focuses on what are known as hybrid 
institutions on the other hand (Richmond 
2011; Boege et al. 2009; MacGinty 2011). 
The former tends to prescribe state-building 
policies, often of a technical type, based 
on the assumption of a Weberian model of 
statehood,2 while the latter tends to over-
emphasize the advantages of the local and 
traditional. According to the CRP defini-
tion, public authority can refer to any form 
of authority beyond the family that com-
mands a minimum of voluntary compliance 
(even in contexts of substantial coercion); 
such an authority could be the state, local 
government, customary authority, religious 
authority, armed groups, community groups, 
international agencies, and so on. The util-
ity of the term is that it enables the scholar 
to study public authority as it is, not as it 
ought to be, and to understand the daily pro-
cesses producing and contesting it; moreo-
ver, it focuses attention on the exercise of 
power rather than merely on institutions. 
What matters is not whether an authority is 
national or local but rather how it functions 
– what CRP describes as the logic of public 
authority. CRP findings suggest that in dif-
ficult conflict-affected places, public author-
ity can usefully be understood as negotiated, 
produced, maintained and reshaped by the 
interplay of three logics of governance. These 
are not normative categories; they are ways 
to describe the actual functioning of public 
authority. Each of these logics results in dif-
ferent forms of security or insecurity.
First, the ‘political marketplace’ is a con-
temporary system of governance in which 
politics is conducted as exchange of political 
services or loyalty for payment or licence to 
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extort resources (de Waal 2009). It is con-
cerned with the market in political power: 
how politicians sustain their political pro-
jects, whether substantive or simply power 
for its own sake, using business principles 
and material transactions. Much of north-
east and central Africa exhibits advanced and 
militarized political markets, characterized 
by pervasive rent-seeking and monetized 
patronage, with violence routinely used as 
a tool for extracting rent. These political 
markets are integrated into regional and 
global circuits of political finance. Politicians 
operate as political entrepreneurs and busi-
ness managers to seek and sustain power in 
 turbulent circumstances.
Second, the logic of ‘moral populism’ 
derives from the idea of a moral order that 
has a degree of purchase among the popu-
lation. It draws upon and reinforces col-
lective ideologies, moral norms, including 
ethnic, religious or spiritual beliefs, to con-
struct forms of public authority that tend 
to crowd out more deliberative possibilities, 
often involving the use of violence for ritual, 
punishment or exclusion. It contains the 
assumption that morality can trump reason 
on occasion and that the people are bounded 
and held together against an ‘other’. It can 
engender stability, but almost invariably at 
the cost of social exclusion and the scape-
goating of the vulnerable. But it can also be a 
source of violence as in the case of vigilante 
gangs or the legitimisation of moral panics.
Third, in many cases a logic of ‘civicness’ 
can be discerned, where individuals and com-
munities organise themselves for mutual 
benefit to provide public services including 
security. Indeed, it is often a survival mecha-
nism. Like the other logics, civicness can be 
exclusive; indeed, all social contracts are by 
their nature bounded. However, civicness is 
based on the Golden Rule, in which outsid-
ers are strangers rather than enemies who 
should be treated humanely, in contrast to 
the other two logics. It is a logic that tends 
to involve more inclusive and horizontal 
forms of self-organisation and more open 
discussion and deliberation, sometimes 
underpinned by individual or collective acts 
of resistance. The use of law and notions of 
stateness and civility are often salient in 
instances of civicness. Stateness broadly 
refers to the character, quality and legiti-
macy of political authority – the system of 
rules and practices often associated with 
a state (Pfister 2004: 22–23), while civil-
ity highlights the norms and practices that 
encourage the kind of social interactions, 
bonds and shared identities necessary for 
reducing fear and achieving stability and 
justice (Rucht 2011; Anheier 2011; Kaldor 
2003). The term civicness can be translated 
into vernacular concepts in conflict settings 
– thus, in the DRC the idea of Citoyeneté, or 
in the Middle East the notion of Madani are 
terms that have similar resonance.
The provision of security must be under-
stood in the context of these three logics. 
The everyday insecurity that is experienced 
by ordinary people is not just a conse-
quence of state weakness or an exogenous 
phenomenon; rather it is necessary for the 
functioning of the dominant logics. In the 
case of the political marketplace, insecurity 
is a mechanism for control and predation 
and, at the same time, it is fear that ani-
mates the discourses and practices of moral 
populism. Only in the context of civicness, 
is it possible to discern relative security.
In what follows, we show how these log-
ics help us to understand the functioning 
of public authority and continuing inse-
curity in Afghanistan. In addition to our 
own research conducted in Afghanistan 
between 2009 and 2012, we build on the 
extensive literature on conflict, violence 
and statebuilding; in particular those schol-
ars who explore political authority through 
a political economy perspective and high-
light how external actors, resources, and 
institutions shape elite incentives, the 
state-society compact, and the political and 
economic order (See, e.g. Goodhand and 
Sedra 2007; Kühn 2008; Nixon and Ponzio 
2007; Suhrke 2013).
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The Political Economy of State-
Building and Counter-Terrorism
Since 2001, external players have exerted 
immense influence in Afghanistan, becom-
ing a foundational part of the domestic 
political landscape, able to shape internal 
affairs and reconfigure local power dynamics 
through their vast resources, local partner-
ships, priorities and aid practices. External 
resources, particularly security assistance, 
have become deeply entangled with the exer-
cise of authority and the emergence of frag-
ile, elite political coalitions, by cultivating a 
‘rentier’ political marketplace characterized 
by pervasive rent-seeking and intense com-
petition among elites for access to resources 
at local, national and international levels 
(Kühn 2008; Maley 2013; Suhrke 2011).
To understand post-2001 political develop-
ments, it is helpful to highlight how previ-
ous patterns of political rule required both 
external financing and skilful management 
of patron-client relations (see Rubin 1995; 
Shahrani 1998; Saikal 2005). Throughout 
history, Afghan rulers have confronted 
strong peripheral forces holding a level of 
autonomy from, and leverage with, central 
authorities (Saikal 2002: 193). Rulers’ lack 
of monopolistic political power meant that 
they often faced considerable challenges 
from strong sub-national elites especially 
when they embarked on modernization 
programs. Unable to mobilize internal rev-
enue sources, their ability to secure external 
rents was critical to the central state’s viabil-
ity. Barnett Rubin (2002: 81–105) argues 
that the rentier nature of state formation 
in Afghanistan entrenched a form of pat-
rimonial rule and never forced the ruling 
elite to develop a social contract or domes-
tic accountability. Instead, rulers entered 
complex patronage-based relationships with 
sub-national elites, and employed strategies 
to co-opt or coerce them into accepting their 
authority. These political pacts, however, 
were contingent on the continued distribu-
tion of externally-sourced rents rather than 
development of internal legitimate social 
and political capital. Thus, these strategies 
often secured loyalty in the short-term, but 
never displaced informal power at local 
levels. Rulers’ political skills and relative 
success in attaining external rents and man-
aging these patron-client relationships have 
been central to determining the extent of 
their regime’s power, authority and stability 
(Saikal 2005: 196).
Since the conflict began in 1979, extreme 
levels of armed violence and the participa-
tion of numerous transnational actors, from 
the Russians and Pakistanis, to the United 
States and the international community, 
have disrupted traditional patron-client rela-
tionships inter alia. Decades of war have mili-
tarized the periphery and have shifted local 
power from traditional leaders towards a new 
class of strongmen with access to guns, funds 
and foreign forces (Giustozzi and Ullah 2007: 
169–172). These commanders introduced 
political-military structures that dislodged 
many of the informal, historically medi-
ated societal relations and mobilized new 
networks along ethnic, religious, tribal, and 
regional lines (Dorronsoro 2005; Giustozzi 
2009; Marten 2012). This reinforced identity 
politics within society, even if these new net-
works enjoyed only limited political legiti-
macy among the population (Goodhand and 
Mansfeld 2010: 6). As conflict deepened, the 
growth of smuggling and illicit economies, 
especially the drug trade, integrated periph-
eral areas into regional economies and fur-
ther increased their autonomy from broader 
society and from the state (ibid). When the 
state collapsed and external support sharply 
decreased during the civil war, commander 
networks in search of new resources became 
progressively predatory to the civilian popu-
lation and involved in transnational criminal 
networks associated with regional ‘shadow 
economies’ connected to smuggling and the 
opium trade (Giustozzi 2009). The violence 
and criminality of this period contributed to 
the groundswell of support for the Taliban, 
who consolidated control over most of the 
country by 1998.
In post-2001 Afghanistan, the exercise of 
political authority is still marked by complex 
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dynamics between external forces, formal 
institutions and the persistent salience of 
informal forces. After the US-led intervention 
dislodged the Taliban regime in 2001, the 
scale of foreign patronage once again dra-
matically increased as external actors set out 
to rebuild the central state and fight the war 
on terror. Vast amounts of security assistance 
further transformed patron-client relations 
and, over time, have narrowed patronage 
networks and made them more exclusionary. 
‘Current-day corruption,’ writes Goodhand 
(2008: 411), ‘appears to be built upon earlier 
practices of patronage, but one of the prin-
cipal differences between the pre-war and 
post-war economy is the level of monetiza-
tion of everyday relationships.’ While tradi-
tional patterns of affiliation by clan, tribe 
and ethnicity persist, the monetization of 
patronage has meant that rulers increasingly 
require large cash budgets or the ability to 
grant local elites license to extract resources 
in order to be successful patrons – a typi-
cal pattern to be observed in the political 
marketplace.
External decisions to prioritize counter-
terrorism over state-building have been cen-
tral to shaping the new political economy 
and creating the conditions that gave rise 
to the current form of the political market-
place in Afghanistan. The nature of the inva-
sion and elite ‘peace settlement’ in 2001 laid 
its foundations rather than create a ‘consti-
tutional moment’ (Afsah 2011: 157) that 
might have helped to construct legitimate 
political authority. Braithwaite and Wardak 
(2013: 186) characterize it as an exclusive 
elite pact between America’s chief allies in 
the war on terror where the state became 
the instrument for a ‘personalized division 
of spoils rather than an institutionalized 
division of powers.’ Allied local command-
ers from the Northern Alliance received 
political and financial rewards to join the 
post-Taliban settlement, allowing them to 
entrench their power in the immediate post-
2001 state in strategic security ministries 
– Interior, Defence, Foreign Affairs and the 
National Directorate of Security – where they 
strengthened their networks of patronage 
and corruption (Danspeckgruber and Finn 
2007: 131).
At the same time, the strong presidential 
system favoured by Karzai and the Bush 
administration, encoded in the 2003 Afghan 
constitution, vested extensive authorities 
in the Presidency. In theory, a strong state 
led by a strong presidency was based on a 
set of ideas that attribute (probably rightly) 
contemporary conflict to state weakness 
and fragility but, which understood state-
building in overly technical terms and failed 
to account for existing de facto power struc-
tures that were extremely fractured and 
decentralized. This serious design flaw in 
the constitution, explains William Maley 
(2013: 258), ‘sharpened political competition 
by holding out the prospect that a strong 
state could be a significant political asset 
to control.’ The highly-centralised design of 
the political system, combined with the near 
wholesale incorporation of non-state armed 
actors into state structures, arguably turned 
them into an instrument for personal gain, 
furnishing opportunities for them to expand 
and consolidate their political-economic 
power to the detriment of the state-building 
effort (Nixon and Ponzio 2007; Rangelov and 
Theros 2012).
The ways in which foreign aid and security 
assistance were delivered further accentuated 
long-standing tensions between regions, and 
between centre and periphery. Considerable 
literature explores how vast amounts of aid 
recreated the structural conditions that led 
to the outbreak of violent conflict in the 
first place (e.g. see for example, Goodhand & 
Sedra 2007; Wilder 2008, and Surkhe 2011). 
While major donors provided funding to 
the central state and focused on building 
formal institutions, foreign security actors 
such as the CIA, the PRTs, and NATO sup-
ported networks and structures outside the 
state, which were often inimical to the state-
building imperative to centralize the means 
of coercion (Zyck 2012: 256, Goodhand and 
Mansfield 2010). These resources cultivated 
regional political economies and shaped the 
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government’s approach to patronage poli-
tics and institution building. Goodhand and 
Mansfield (2010: 13) explain how contradic-
tory policies affected bargaining processes in 
Afghanistan’s political marketplace:
Military and financial support for 
the central state had the effect of 
lowering the price of loyalty, thus 
decreasing the necessity for central 
state elites to negotiate with periph-
eral elites. Conversely, CIA funding of 
regional ‘warlords’ artificially inflated 
the price of loyalty, strengthening the 
bargaining powering in relation to 
the central state.
Like previous eras, the post-2001 distribu-
tion of power and authority rests on the 
ability of elites to appropriate resources 
and distribute them to their clients. At the 
sub-national level, elites have developed 
sophisticated strategies to strengthen their 
powerbases and bolster their patronage 
networks by ‘managing their resources and 
position in regional economic networks, 
both licit and illicit, while also tapping into 
international support’ (Barma 2017: 182–3). 
Links to foreign actors have benefitted them, 
e.g. through off-budget security assistance to 
paramilitary groups, the control of construc-
tion companies and provision of goods, as 
well the proposal of beneficiaries of recon-
struction aid. Patronage connections to the 
centre have remained a major source of 
wealth accumulation and power, especially 
after Karzai worked to ensure greater control 
over appointments that provide access to 
internal revenue sources as well as business 
opportunities.3 The emergence of monopo-
lies controlled by politically-connected elites 
has fuelled violent racketeering in the pri-
vate sector and undermined the creation of 
a competitive private sector. Criminality and 
the expanding drug economy has furnished 
even greater avenues of patronage, impli-
cating elites across the country: Goodhand 
notes, for example, that an estimated 80 per-
cent of parliamentary candidates had some 
form of contact or involvement with drug 
traffickers and armed groups (Goodhand 
2008, fn. 3).
The Logic of the Political 
Marketplace and the Rise of Karzai’s 
Neo-Patrimonial Rule
Ironically, Karzai was propelled to power 
under the US-sponsored Bonn agreement 
precisely because he was considered a weak, 
and therefore exploitable, choice with a 
 limited domestic network of independent 
support. It was this perceived weakness that 
convinced Northern Alliance command-
ers to give their consent to the preferred 
US candidate. When he became head of 
the Transitional Administration in 2002, 
he inherited a barely existent government 
with limited coercive capabilities and con-
trol over financial resources (Mukhopadhyay 
2016). The elite settlement at Bonn, paired 
with the US decision to block the expan-
sion of NATO forces beyond Kabul in 2002, 
further complicated his attempts to extend 
his authority and regulate inherited political 
arrangements in the provinces. His vulner-
abilities were compounded by aid practices 
– including vast security assistance – that cre-
ated an ‘aid-and-war economy’ which largely 
bypassed central government officials and 
channelled resources directly into the coffers 
of sub-national elites (Suhrke 2013: 275–6). 
What aid did flow through the central gov-
ernment was heavily ear-marked, further 
constraining Karzai’s budgetary authority for 
policy-making.
The logic of a decentralized, rentier politi-
cal marketplace was central to shaping presi-
dential strategies for power and political 
survival. Within this marketplace, Karzai was 
only one of the newest entrants in a some-
what crowded field; and he controlled lim-
ited resources. Logically, Karzai’s strategy to 
enhance his domestic power was predicated 
on making presidential patronage a central 
feature of Afghan politics at the expense 
of rational institution-building. Thanks to 
the highly-centralized design of the politi-
cal system and the extensive legal and con-
stitutional powers vested in the presidency, 
Karzai’s ability to legislate by decree and 
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make extensive appointments across central 
and sub-national levels were key to manag-
ing elite competition, purchasing loyalty 
and capturing resources (Maley 2013: 259; 
Suhrke 2013: 278). Most of these strategies 
had little to do with sustaining the state or 
promoting development. Rather, they served 
to co-opt competing commander networks, 
divide the opposition, and foster reliance 
on access to state power and presidential 
patronage (Forsberg 2012).
While the logic of a rentier political mar-
ketplace informed Karzai’s power strate-
gies, he also invoked identity politics and 
appeals to Islam – demonstrating how he 
has attempted to combine elements of moral 
populism in his larger power strategy to gen-
erate cooperation and popular support. In 
a deeply conservative and religious society 
like Afghanistan, the strategic use of Islam 
has played a central role in the strategies of 
political actors ‘to legitimize their actions, 
mobilize support, undermine rivals, attract 
foreign aid, and control populations’ (Sinno 
2010: 25). Yet, his ability to leverage Islam 
met with little success due to the growing 
appeal of the Taliban against the perceived 
‘moral corruption’ of his key allies in govern-
ment and his foreign-backers, whose actions 
are increasingly viewed by many citizens as 
anti-Muslim.4 As William Maley has noted in 
his study on legitimization strategies during 
the pre-2001 conflict, ‘Islam has proved to be 
an ideology of resistance to, rather than sup-
port for, the regime’ (Maley 1987; 717–718).
When Karzai first assumed power, he ini-
tially aligned himself with Western-educated 
technocrats such as Ali Jalali and Ashraf 
Ghani and directly confronted commanders. 
He pursued strategies to remove regional 
strongmen, such as Ismail Khan in Herat, by 
forcing them to accept positions in Kabul to 
break links with their constituents (Sharan 
2011: 1121). Yet, his ability to marginalize 
them between 2002 and 2004 proved dif-
ficult given their continued relationships 
with foreign forces and his lack of coercive 
control. Many had forged direct relation-
ships with external actors and received con-
siderable funds outside formal government 
channels through foreign civil and military 
programs (Mukhopadhyay 2016). As aid 
became converted into the political cur-
rency of patronage, they strengthened their 
networks of armed men under their control 
and could present a direct challenge to his 
government. Their growing power was dem-
onstrated in 2004 after they mobilized their 
ethno-regional networks and performed well 
in the parliamentary elections.
Around this time, Karzai increasingly 
faced the reality that the US would con-
tinue its support to regional powerbrokers 
as part of its counter-terror mission. After 
the 2005 election when his political calcu-
lus shifted, Karzai began to shed the early 
reformers in favour of an inner circle com-
posed of family members, loyalists and key 
commanders. He then pursued strategies to 
co-opt and divide the opposition through 
government patronage in the form of gov-
ernment appointments, capture of lucrative 
contracts, and protection from prosecu-
tion (Sharan and Heathershaw 2011: 315). 
‘This network is part of his survival mecha-
nism’, explained former US Ambassador to 
Afghanistan, Ron Neumann to the New York 
Times (Risen 2010); ‘Karzai is convinced that 
we are going to abandon him [so] what’s his 
answer? To create a web of loyalties and 
militia commanders and corrupt families all 
knitted together.’
The corruption of the Afghan state rose in 
part because of the Karzai administration’s 
weakness and high political cost of con-
fronting it. Given that the price of loyalty 
was artificially inflated by external assis-
tance, his use of patronage to extend his 
authority and build alliances in exchange 
for loyalty often meant tolerating the use 
of delegated state authority for private gain 
and criminality (Maley 2013). When the 
US began to realize how corruption had 
become a key driver of the insurgency by 
2009, Karzai’s relationship with his patrons 
started to sour over anti-corruption initia-
tives and he began acting more decisively 
to reshape the distribution of power in 
Afghanistan (Interview, UN official, Kabul 
2011). He pursued several strategies:
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° First, he began openly criticizing and 
distancing himself from unpopular US 
policies, such as air strikes and night 
raids, to increase foreign deference to 
him, knowing that they also depended 
on him to pursue their counter-terror 
objectives;
° Second, as the 2009 elections neared, 
he and his allies sought alliances 
with key commander leaders, such as 
Marshal Fahim, the de facto head of 
the Northern Alliance who controlled 
powerful patronage networks;
° Third, he worked to ensure greater 
control over patronage and revenue 
streams, including foreign spend-
ing, internal revenues and criminal 
proceeds.
These strategies played themselves out dif-
ferently across the country but they made 
Karzai increasingly reliant on ‘criminalized 
patronage networks’ that linked corrupt 
officials, businessman, warlords and even 
Taliban commanders in mutually beneficial 
relationships (Forsberg and Sullivan 2016). In 
the insecure south, where the drug trade and 
large amounts of security spending outside 
government channels constituted the major 
sources of wealth, Karzai sought to capture 
and control these revenue streams via family 
members and other allies (Aikens 2012). His 
half-brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, for exam-
ple, became the most powerful political 
figure in Kandahar, where he oversaw a vast 
patronage network until his assassination in 
July 2011. Their patronage to southern drug 
networks, financiers and hawala networks, 
and other allies in exchange for support to 
the Karzai regime allowed them to consoli-
date control over private security, real estate 
and contracting.
In the north, where commanders had 
deeply infiltrated state institutions, his 
political calculus focused on co-opting pow-
erful patronage networks and making them 
dependent on his patronage through shared 
business ventures and protection from pros-
ecution. His ability to reorganize alliances 
was made possible by the growing influ-
ence of money in the new political economy, 
where money began trumping party, ethnic 
and regional loyalties to some extent. The 
Kabul Bank stood at the heart of his strategy 
to buy off rivals and incorporate them into a 
rent-seeking coalition that brought together 
northern and southern elites. Although the 
bank’s collapse threatened the government’s 
financial sustainability, it proved critical 
to Karzai’s short-term political survival by 
cementing an alliance with Marshal Fahim, 
who ensured the support of his powerful 
networks in Karzai’s re-election campaign.
The Kabul Bank case represents a clear 
example of how politics and money mix 
in Afghanistan’s rentier political market-
place. It functioned as a financing network, 
underwritten by international aid money 
and poor Afghan depositors, that linked 
together the military, political, criminal 
and economic elite around the narrow net-
works of the Karzai and Fahim families.5 The 
Bank was run by the Chairman and CEO, 
with backgrounds in smuggling and crimi-
nal activity during the pre-2001 conflicts, 
as a Ponzi scheme with new deposits fund-
ing unsecured loans to the powerful. These 
two men sought alliances with the brothers 
of President Karzai and Marshal Fahim to 
buy government patronage and protection 
(Forsberg 2012). ‘The only way to become a 
successful businessman is to be linked to the 
political caste,’ explained one civil society 
actor (Interview, Kabul, 2011). Indeed, soon 
after they secured the brothers as share-
holders, the bank was awarded several large 
government contracts that covered its mush-
rooming liabilities, including one to pay civil 
servants at a sum of $75 million per month 
(Interview, Kabul, UNAMA official, July 
2011; Filkins 2011; Rubin and Risen 2011). 
For Karzai, the bank financed his successful 
election campaign, bought the vote banks 
of his rivals and divided his opposition. His 
continued protection of its key players in 
its aftermath despite the high political cost 
demonstrates how important it was in stabi-
lizing relations among competing networks, 
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serving as a ‘visible marker of a national-level 
political settlement’ (Aikens 2012: 4).
Violence and Instability in 
Afghanistan’s Rentier Political 
Marketplace
Under Karzai’s system of governance, 
Afghanistan has functioned primarily as 
an aid-based rentier political marketplace, 
in which the President provided access to 
government patronage and protection in 
the form of government appointments and 
access to lucrative contracts and business 
opportunities. In this way, the President 
could consolidate a fractured rentier market-
place into a more consolidated one, bring-
ing many of the powerful commanders and 
regional warlords into a fragile rent-seeking 
coalition. This system of patronage may have 
helped ensure his short-term political sur-
vival, but it has undermined the long-term 
viability of the state, making it completely 
dependent on the presence of foreign 
forces and continued inflows of aid and 
security assistance.
The rentier political marketplace in 
Afghanistan has proved to be inherently 
unstable and violent. It has produced an 
anarchic model of security, which has led to 
more insecurity and conflict in the country 
and creates an environment where anti-
government elements have flourished. There 
were several paradoxical trajectories during 
this period of inquiry: the accumulation of 
power by the Karzai regime, mainly in the 
form of centralizing patronage, on the one 
hand, and the dispersion of violence and 
fragmentation on the other (Rangelov and 
Theros 2012: 243–244). Karzai’s strategy of 
building alliances with regional powerbro-
kers by renting their loyalty helped contrib-
ute to his political survival, but it was ‘not 
able to constrain and control the preda-
tory behaviour of such actors or shift their 
basis in violence, exploitation and crimi-
nality’ (ibid:). Indeed, the ability of these 
powerbrokers and their clients to commit 
crimes with impunity, explain Forsberg and 
Sullivan (2016: 15) ‘established a precedent 
of violence and coercion as valid tools to be 
wielded by government elites.’
Braithwaite and Wardak (2012) argue that 
a Hobbesian view of Afghanistan adopted 
by the international community led them 
to push for a ‘Leviathan’ as the Hobbesian 
response to the disorder and anarchy. Our 
argument is somewhat different, namely 
that the emphasis on reaching agreement 
among warlords from the top as a form of 
constitution-making, akin to agreements 
like Dayton or Oslo, ended up entrenching 
a political marketplace. Because western 
donors had a rather technical understand-
ing of security, their whole security strat-
egy, which was based on building up local 
and national security forces, further nour-
ished the political marketplace. This con-
tributed to the rise of Karzai’s repression, 
as well as the development of initiatives 
from the ‘bottom-up’ to create paramilitary 
forces under the control of the Ministry of 
Interior. Yet, these programs did not pro-
vide community policing capabilities and 
instead, ended up regularizing existing 
militias (Lefevre 2010: 1).
As Goodhand and Hakimi (2014: 6) explain, 
‘Western efforts to regulate the security 
market have been contradictory and often 
ill considered. On the one hand, interven-
tions were directed toward bureaucratizing 
coercion by building up a monopoly on the 
means of violence through security sector 
reform…. On the other hand, foreign forces 
continued to support and fund local power 
brokers, creating militias and deploying pri-
vate security companies, who operated either 
above or below the law.’ Without sufficient 
attention to the influence of patronage net-
works, formal institutionalism had afforded 
opportunities for commanders incorporated 
in the political process to integrate their 
ethno-militia networks within the Afghan 
National Security Forces and consolidate 
their political and economic power (Lister 
2007; Gordon 2009: 123). This severely 
compromised efforts to professionalize the 
forces, especially the police, and triggered 
the emergence of new forms of conflict and 
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illicit activities (Tadjbakhsh and Schoiswohl 
2008: 259).
 At the same time, initiatives aimed at 
building local defence groups have also 
been riddled with controversy. Vanda Felbab-
Brown explains that, with little oversight and 
accountability mechanisms in place, financial 
flows through these programs have strength-
ened existing strongmen and at times, even 
spurred violence between rival allies in their 
attempts to monopolize money (Felbab-
Brown 2013: 195). Yet, US military officials 
interviewed in 2011 called the Afghan Local 
Police (ALP) ‘the closest thing we have to a 
game changer’ for local security (Interviews, 
Kabul 2011), even as Afghans consistently 
described them as militias prone to abusing 
civilians, engaging in criminal activities, and 
intensifying local rivalries. In highly polar-
ized areas with little history of tribal militias, 
these programs hijacked by rent-seeking 
commanders have furthered the security 
dilemma among local communities and 
deepened ethnic antagonisms; in Baghlan, 
for example, efforts to stand up Pashtun ALP 
units in 2011 sparked rival Tajik powerbro-
kers to arm their ethnically-based militias 
(interviews, NATO officials, Kabul, 2011).
In this rentier political marketplace, the 
threat or exercise of violence has become 
a central part of the bargaining process. 
Political actors with coercive power can 
engage in threats of violence to demonstrate 
the power they hold and negotiate better 
deals for themselves. William Byrd (2016) 
explores how these dynamics played out dur-
ing the presidential elections in 2014–2015 
after the end of Karzai’s term, highlighting 
the challenges of holding elections in an 
unstable political marketplace during a criti-
cal period of ‘transition’ and reduction of for-
eign forces. The contested elections invited 
threats of violence and secession from north-
ern elites with coercive power opposed to the 
outcome of a second-round that saw Ashraf 
Ghani win over Abdullah Abdullah. With a 
strong powerbase and control over armed 
violence in Balkh province, Governor Atta’s 
threat of violence encouraged the interven-
tion of Secretary John Kerry and helped the 
‘loser’ of the elections negotiate a position 
for himself within an extra-constitutional 
‘national unity’ government even before the 
results of an inquiry were completed.
The Logic of Moral Populism: the 
Taliban Approach to Authority and 
Security
The increasingly heterogeneous group of 
anti-government armed elements is often 
labelled ‘Taliban’.6 These different forces 
are neither ideologically coherent nor sim-
ply reflecting the growing appeal of Taliban 
ideology as such (Rutting 2009: 1–2). Anand 
Gopal cautions that the Taliban cannot be 
divided into neat categories of ideological 
leadership and rank-and-file fighters moti-
vated by financial concerns (Gopal 2013: 3). 
Even so, Taliban strategies for power and 
legitimation can be broadly characterized by 
the logic of moral populism, although ele-
ments of the political marketplace clearly 
shape and contribute to their strategies for 
survival and expansion in the post-2001 
period. Their ability to exploit the dynam-
ics of exclusion and marginalization engen-
dered by Karzai’s governance system and 
an aggressive foreign military presence has 
been central to their progress. Since 2006, 
they have conducted an increasingly success-
ful campaign of violence and propaganda to 
gain local support (or acquiescence) and to 
appeal to morally-imbued identities and reli-
gious values to project themselves as a just 
alternative to the externally-backed Karzai 
regime. Even if their exclusivist agenda does 
not resonate with most Afghan citizens, the 
significance of their moral populism lies in 
the framework it provides for legitimizing 
grievances and mobilizing individual and 
collective action among the marginalized 
and disaffected.
Their ability to draw support from the pop-
ulation stems from their deep knowledge of 
the social landscape, where they have taken 
advantage of patterns of exclusion – whether 
of an excluded ethnic group, tribe or even 
segment of a tribe (Gopal 2016). For some 
communities, predation and marginalization 
at various levels of governance have pushed 
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them to align with insurgent groups stra-
tegically in the short-term as they react to 
abuses, seek revenge or position themselves 
for greater influence (Rangelov and Theros 
2012: 241). Among foot soldiers, the Taliban 
have used financial incentives and an ideo-
logical framework for recruitment, but many 
also take up arms due to grievances rather 
than an appeal to their political program 
(Giustozzi 2012c; Chayes 2015). Documented 
interviews with fighters show that abusive 
practices committed by government and pro-
government forces such as arbitrary arrests, 
land grabs, as well as torture and execu-
tions have been key motivating factors for 
individuals (Ladbury et al. 2009). The study 
concludes that ‘young men become Taliban 
combatants for a mix of reasons…but their 
peers then ‘radicalize’ them into presenting 
their cause only in terms of jihad and only 
with reference with Islam’ (Ladbury et al. 
2009: 4).
To make claims of legitimacy, the Taliban 
have sought to communicate a strategic 
vision for justice and security around Afghan 
sovereignty and Islamic principles as defined 
by the Taliban themselves (Semple 2014; 
Weigand 2017). Their Eid al-Fitr statements, 
for example, have highlighted government 
predation while other propaganda materials 
have fed on perceptions of injustice and mar-
ginalization (CFR 2015). Their messages have 
drawn upon collective experiences of abuse 
and popular suspicions of the West’s malign 
intentions to portray the Karzai govern-
ment as morally-corrupt and controlled by 
anti-Muslim powers. Their simple strategic 
vision of sharia enforcement finds resonance 
among Afghan citizens eager to end the 
criminality and impunity that has flourished 
under the Karzai regime (Semple 2014).
Significantly, these anti-corruption narra-
tives evoke the founding myth of the original 
Taliban movement in the 1990s when they 
gained initial support from the goal of restor-
ing order and ending warlord rule (Gopal 
2010: 7). In the post-2001 period, they once 
again employed this rallying cry and devel-
oped a discourse of moral corruption that 
links the externally-backed Karzai regime 
to the predations of the pre-2001 period 
of warlordism, criminality and extensive 
foreign interference (Broschk 2011). Even 
as they have fanned ethnic or tribal resent-
ments to mobilize Pashtun communities, 
they have consistently downplayed tribal, 
regional or ethnic identities in favour of an 
Islamic Afghan identity. By deploying the 
language of religious legitimacy and moral 
righteousness, they have strived to ‘re-brand 
themselves as a broad-based independence 
movement’ aimed at defending the Afghan 
people against external invaders, rather than 
the rural and Pashtun-based fundamen-
talist movement they had been pre-2001 
(Brahimi 2010: 4).
Their discourse of jihad should not be 
overestimated given the history of state 
crises in Afghanistan, when society has 
become mobilized by narratives of abuse 
and oppression – especially across religious 
groups (Roy 1990; Dorronsorro 2005: 104–
109). It should be noted that the Taliban 
have contributed the majority of civilian 
casualties, even while they seek to provide 
a rhetorical alternative to Afghanistan’s 
predatory order. They have used religion 
to legitimize the extreme violence they 
employ to control communities, destroy 
opponents and gain the acquiescence of 
local leaders – but then blame the gov-
ernment for its inability to stem insecu-
rity. They have increasingly acknowledged 
public discontent over abuses and civilian 
casualties, and have responded by creat-
ing an ombudsman and codes of conduct, 
the Layeha, which sets out guidelines for 
local Taliban commanders on treating the 
population fairly (Kilcullen 2010: 157–158). 
Even though these nominal mechanisms of 
redress for the population have not func-
tioned properly, Vanda Felbab-Brown (2013: 
56) argues, their establishment demon-
strates their sophisticated communications 
operations and stands ‘in stark contrast to 
the absence of accountability mechanisms 
for government officials or pro-government 
powerbrokers.’
By 2009–2010, at the peak of Karzai’s gov-
ernance regime, the Taliban had expanded 
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their shadow governance apparatus to nearly 
every province, aside from Panjshir – the 
heartland of the Tajik-dominated Northern 
Alliance (Giustozzi 2012a). In areas under 
their control, the provision of effective jus-
tice has been central to their progress as it 
underpins their claim to legitimacy, high-
lights government corruption, and responds 
to community needs (Giustozzi and Baczko 
2014). When the Taliban came to power in 
1996 on a manifesto of security and justice, 
they imposed a harsh but effective legal 
order based on religious authority with the 
acquiescence of tribal justice authorities 
(Sinno 2008). Similarly, the exclusive model 
of security and justice they have extended 
in the post-2001 period is aligned with their 
vision of reorganizing Afghan society along 
Islamic principles (Semple 2014). As early as 
2003, they reconstituted their justice sys-
tem as an alternative to the official one, and 
over time, their courts gained popularity by 
resolving local disputes, such as land con-
flicts, and making resolutions of agreements 
stick (Kühn 2011). Despite the harsh pun-
ishments meted out, their court system has 
offered more predictability, accessibility and 
reliability than the arbitrary system of state 
justice, in which the individual who pays the 
highest bribes to the most people over the 
longest period wins (Weigand 2017).
At the same time, the Taliban’s survival 
and expansion in post-2001 has been highly 
dependent on Pakistan and the maintenance 
of a large patronage network of clerics and 
fighters (Semple 2014). With the sanctu-
ary and active support provided by Pakistan 
in terms of training, funding, munitions 
and supplies, the Taliban regrouped and 
launched an increasingly successful insur-
gency that expanded in scale and geographi-
cal scope. In mid-2008, Seth Jones (2010) 
reported that ‘the United States [had] col-
lected fairly solid evidence of senior level 
complicity [in Pakistan’s intelligence services 
support to the Taliban].’ Wiegand (2017: 17) 
notes that many Afghans in government-
controlled areas perceive the Taliban as 
a group acting in the interest of Pakistan 
rather than legitimate ‘jihadists’. A religious 
leader we interviewed in 2009 explained, 
‘the Taliban are not fighting for the will of 
God and country but to protect foreign inter-
ests in Afghanistan,’ although he added that 
foot soldiers primarily fight for money or out 
of anger at the abuses committed by govern-
ment or international forces (Author inter-
view, Jalalabad, 2009).
Elements of the political marketplace in 
the functioning of the Taliban insurgency 
can also be seen in their accumulation 
strategies and administration of patronage 
networks. While they have relied on local 
taxation as a source of income, they have also 
been linked to drug smuggling, predatory 
economic activities, transnational criminal 
networks and international fund-raising, and 
pay-offs from pro-government forces for the 
protection of assets to finance their activities 
and their network of fighters. They have used 
financial incentives to recruit poor farmers 
and unemployed young men as fighters and 
have gained local acquiescence by providing 
entitlements, livelihoods and benefits such 
as stipends for wedding expenses and Hajj 
trips, motorbikes and other gifts. Michael 
Semple describes the movement as a ‘mas-
sive redistributive enterprise, forcefully accu-
mulating resources and channelling them’ 
to those loyal to them (Semple 2014). Even 
so, some suggest (e.g. Schmeidl 2010: 10) 
that the failure of government initiatives to 
buy-off lower level Taliban members ‘dem-
onstrate the limits to the monetization of 
the political marketplace’ and the degree to 
which political loyalty could be bought by 
the highest bidder.
Yet, despite efforts to provide an alterna-
tive to Afghanistan’s post-2001 predatory 
order, their brutality and exclusivist ideol-
ogy have continued to alienate most Afghan 
citizens and communities, especially in 
areas where a history of mass atrocities has 
predisposed populations to oppose them. 
In localities under their effective control, 
their predatory rule has often provoked 
local backlash. Abusive practices include the 
forced conscription of youth, kidnapping 
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and ransoming, assassinations, corruption 
and criminality, and forcibly taking wives 
for their commanders. While their exclusiv-
ist conception of justice, which promotes 
hadood – or corporal punishment for crimi-
nal offenses – and extreme gender segrega-
tion has some appeal, it remains contested 
among Islamic jurists and among the larger 
population. In Afghanistan’s crowded mar-
ketplace, the Taliban appear to have a ceil-
ing to their reach, both militarily and in their 
powers to morally persuade.
The Logic of Civicness: the role of 
Civil Society
We suggest that the logic of civicness can 
be most clearly discerned in Afghan con-
ceptions and practices of civil society – as 
defined by Afghan citizens themselves. To 
explore instances and practices of civicness, 
this article draws on a civil society dialogue 
process we facilitated in Afghanistan that 
investigated the dynamics of violence at 
local levels, and captured some of the com-
plex ways in which citizens understand, 
manage and respond to risk and insecurity 
during a specific period: 2009–2012 – the 
peak of President Karzai’s consolidation of 
his system of governance. It draws on con-
sultations and dialogues with more than 
200 Afghan citizens across a range of social 
groups, including professors and local teach-
ers, religious and community leaders, youth, 
civil society and community-based activists 
from across eight provinces (Balkh, Baghlan, 
Herat, Takhar, Nangarhar, Kabul, Khost and 
Kandahar).7 Such an analysis of local reali-
ties and social actions through multiple dia-
logues illustrates how Afghan experiences 
of trauma and insecurity have generated a 
deeply normative understanding of civil soci-
ety – one that seeks to promote the values 
of a ‘just society’ while informing the modes 
of action possible in a context of predatory 
governance and violent insurgency.
The research project was co-designed 
and facilitated with Afghan researchers 
and activists to manage, at least in part, 
ethical concerns permeating the entire 
process, including issues of positionality and 
power relations as they play out in conflict 
areas (Sultana 2005; Herr and Anderson 
2005). Participants were selected in such 
a way as to capture different perspectives, 
genders, ages, social positions, and different 
‘regions’ of the country that represent the 
diverse political, social and security experi-
ences that exist. It is important to note that 
participants were not intended to be statisti-
cally representative nor representative of the 
entire range of actors and opinions. Indeed, 
there were biases towards those concerned 
about the ‘common good’, those engaged 
and/or seeking to play a role in their com-
munities, and those willing to share their 
ideas and experiences.
Interviews and dialogues were conducted 
in the format of in-depth conversations, with 
the use of open-ended questions aimed at 
triggering discussions on their lived experi-
ences of insecurity, as well as their ideas for 
what might constitute a more legitimate and 
stable political order. Of particular interest 
was how relations with political authorities 
– e.g. external actors, state and local-level 
officials, and informal powerbrokers – were 
perceived and managed. Because the term 
civil society – or jamea-e-madani – is largely 
understood in Afghanistan as ‘signifying 
civilized society’ (Schmeidl 2009), the term 
acted as a useful entry point for engaging 
the ‘moral imagination’ of individuals who 
wished to reflect on and redefine the social 
contexts they shared and to consider the 
kind of society they wished (Bakhtin 1989; 
Taylor 2004). At times, the format of discus-
sions (e.g. individual interviews, single-iden-
tity dialogues, or mixed dialogues) had to 
be adapted last minute to account for secu-
rity considerations – for example, in locales 
where political authority was more con-
solidated, e.g. in Balk province, participants 
preferred individual interviews over group 
dialogues as they feared potential surveil-
lance by participants who might be linked 
to political authorities. The series of inter-
views and smaller dialogues (each between 
six to ten participants) largely took place in 
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provincial capitals but included participants 
from surrounding areas, urban and rural. 
Two larger dialogues consisting of over 120 
plus individuals from across the country 
took place in Kabul and Mazar in 2011.
In Afghanistan, citizen and community 
efforts to both manage risk and envision a 
different way of life are greatly determined 
by their experiences of wartime violence, 
their perceptions and interactions with the 
structures and agents of security and author-
ity at different levels, and their own (compet-
ing) ideas of what constitutes a just, secure 
and inclusive order. Across dialogues, a sense 
of profound disappointment was pervasive: 
participants had expected a transition from 
violence and repression but instead watched 
‘the same actors and groups who destroyed 
the country benefit from the intervention.’ 
‘The system is bad at its core,’ exclaimed a 
young female teacher in Baghlan (2011), 
while a community leader from a village in 
Nangarhar echoed, ‘this system is rigged.’ A 
young man from Balk explained, ‘to have real 
power here, you need money, guns and con-
nections’ (Mazar-e-Sharif, 2011). Over time, 
between 2009 and 2012, most participants 
in the dialogues spoke of ‘collusion’ between 
various parties to the conflict, describing the 
cycle of instability as a ‘mutual enterprise’ 
where belligerents from opposing sides 
use insecurity as a cover for personal and 
political ambitions. A young Kabuli man, 
explained, ‘the problems are interlinked, it is 
like a game, or a chain where all have per-
sonal financial interests’ in maintaining inse-
curity (Kabul, 2011).
By 2012, the abuse of power was increas-
ingly seen as an organizing principle of the 
post-2001 political order, whereby elites 
derive power both from external actors and 
their ability to manipulate divisions within 
a fragmented society through ethnic and 
factional mobilization. These dynamics of 
insecurity and marginalization produced by 
the political marketplace had also generated 
opportunities for the Taliban to strengthen 
their power, especially by claiming the abil-
ity to resolve the many local conflicts at 
the community level that have become 
politicized and instrumentalised even if they 
still acknowledged the central role external 
players (namely Pakistan) played in financ-
ing the insurgency. For the participants, the 
expansion and consolidation of the Taliban is 
an outcome both of abusive policies by state 
actors and of international engagement poli-
cies that weaken (and corrupt) civil society 
and traditional structures for mediating dis-
putes. Religious and tribal leaders described 
how externally-backed strongmen were 
disrupting social mores, undermining tra-
ditional processes for resolving conflict and 
redirecting development down violent paths. 
They discussed the loss of their authority and 
ability to mediate disputes within and across 
communities. Youth and grassroots activists 
also explained how they struggled to address 
challenges, advocate and coordinate civic 
action in an evolving security climate and 
context where donor-support is channelled 
to urban NGOs, many of which were con-
trolled by politically-connected individuals.
Where questions of societal disintegration 
and public (in)security loom large, they held 
a deeply normative understanding of civil 
society, which they defined in reaction to 
their lived experiences of insecurity and dep-
rivation along with their perceptions of who 
has benefitted from the ‘business of war’. 
They contrasted civil society with a violent 
society dominated by predatory actors, both 
state and non-state. This accords with other 
research that found that, in Afghanistan, civil 
society is conceived as ‘a different way of life, 
one that is not dominated by jang and tofang 
salars [gunlords, warlords]’ (Schmeidl 2009: 
69). Civil society was not distinguished from 
the state but from un-civil society, and rep-
resented a different kind of life across politi-
cal, economic, social and private spheres. It 
was seen as both a goal to achieve and an 
approach to remedy the current ills of society 
including insecurity, societal disintegration 
and material deprivation.
The notions of ‘stateness’ and civility were 
salient in their conceptions of civil society. 
Different visions of state-society relations 
were certainly expressed, ranging from 
an Islamic state to religious freedom and 
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tolerance in a more secular state, but the 
notion of ‘state-ness’ was emphasized by 
a common language calling for legitimate 
leadership and national unity underpin-
ning these competing visions. Nearly all 
assumed the need for a state strong enough 
to monopolize the legitimate use of vio-
lence, enforce minimal rules and facilitate 
peaceful relations, and provide minimally 
adequate services of justice, health and 
education. Civility, in contrast, emphasized 
the role of people in producing their own 
ideal of ‘democracy’ or participatory govern-
ance rooted in local values and religion, and 
became associated with the individual and 
group actions aimed at creating new kinds 
of political, security and civil arrangements 
at local and national levels. Encouraging 
civility was seen as central to the creation of 
a shared sense of identity and citizenship, 
in order to go beyond the logic of persistent 
rent-seeking and material benefits preva-
lent in the current political order.
Empirically, dialogue participants also 
applied the normative conception of civil 
society to the range of state, non-state, and 
economic actors. For example, profession-
alized NGOs were rarely included as part 
of civil society, but nor were the ‘uncivil’ 
armed elements that many social scien-
tists often speak about within civil society. 
Instead, civil society included many state, 
non-state, religious, economic and even 
kin-based actors normally excluded from 
Western definitions of civil society – as long 
as they worked towards the ‘public interest’ 
and ‘common good’ as opposed to factional 
and personal gain. They spoke of poets who 
used satire to challenge the status quo; the 
policeman who stops a suicide bomber 
without regards for his life; the public sec-
tor worker who did his job well in the face 
of intimidation and corruption; the mullah 
who supported educating girls in his com-
munity; and, the activist exposing abuses in 
the security sector. When conceived in this 
way, they applied qualities of civility and 
the public interest to measure which actors 
should be included in civil society, and to 
allocate their functions.
Among participants, civicness could be 
found in individual acts of ‘moral courage’, 
in creative expression, and in strengthen-
ing ‘solidarity’ or ‘stability’ networks that 
can challenge the influence of uncivil pow-
erbrokers and promote a new sense of pub-
lic interest among the population. Central, 
they explained, was the need for strategies 
to ‘connect and communicate’ to build trust 
relationships and dampen down fear across 
communities. In the dialogues, Afghan citi-
zens spoke of the micro-actions people took 
to resist the war system, to prevent the fur-
ther fragmentation of the country, and to 
challenge political authorities (inside and 
outside the state) who claimed to authen-
tically represent them. They emphasized 
actions that encourage civicness across com-
munities and individuals – whether regional, 
ethnic, or party – to reduce the influence of 
alternative powerbrokers exploiting societal 
tensions and institutions for personal, politi-
cal and material gain. For many, especially 
those in the provinces, the value of devel-
oping a networked approach lay in creating 
secure spaces for association, dialogue and 
collective action, while providing protection 
and expanding constituencies for peace.
Numerous examples, however small, of 
individuals and groups cooperating across 
social, geographical and other divides to 
break through client networks, decrease 
their isolation, and strengthen connections 
were cited. For example, modern and tradi-
tional civil society actors have engaged in 
dialogues despite differences in values and 
agendas to discuss political, security and 
social issues. Women’s groups have worked 
with religious shuras and leaders to promote 
women’s rights within cultural and religious 
frameworks. In the east, representatives of 
local shuras, modern NGOs, and religious 
networks have worked together to publicize 
egregious examples of corruption and abuse, 
despite intimidation (Dialogues, Nangarhar, 
2010). Other village elders mentioned how 
they formed consultation groups attended 
by farmers, community elders, teachers, driv-
ers, and businessmen to discuss how to best 
resolve their problems (ibid).
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Connecting these local associations into 
a national network of solidarity emerged as 
a shared vision but violence and insecurity 
prevented their ability to stitch together 
their efforts and activities. Many of them 
interpreted the series of conflicts as one long 
war against civil society: violence did not 
simply engulf civilians and local communi-
ties, it has been directed deliberately at the 
cultural and traditional values and struc-
tures in society. Over the past three decades, 
intellectuals, tribal and community lead-
ers, religious elders, and moderate political 
forces have been the first casualties of war. 
These groups were targeted equally by com-
munists, mujahedeen commanders and the 
Taliban during the 1980s and 1990s, and 
then again, after 2001, by insurgent forces, 
corrupt officials and local pro-government 
strongmen enjoying international support. 
They described how internal and external 
forces continue to undermine civil society 
through violence, co-option, and political dis-
enfranchisement. Across all dialogues, youth 
believed local officials and powerbrokers 
intimidate students to reduce their potential 
to organize and challenge the established 
order. Many, especially in insecure areas 
of Nangarhar, discussed the fear of being 
associated with the ‘wrong crowd’ by the 
Taliban, US forces or the government. Other 
reports have explored how religious leaders 
became increasingly squeezed between the 
Taliban and the government-aligned jihadi 
warlords, ‘creat(ing) a dynamic which forces 
religious leaders to keep a low profile or join 
the militant opposition (Borchgrevink and 
Harpviken 2010: 10). Many repeatedly com-
plained that government and Western actors 
only sought assistance when they required 
public support, and that this type of co-
optation decreased their influence in their 
communities.
It is worth noting that the themes of 
civil society, bottom-up engagement, and 
grassroots mobilization did indeed become 
increasingly central in international policy 
discourses and practices in Afghanistan. An 
active civil society was expected to provide 
a vehicle for development, a buffer against 
corrupt actors breeding violence, and a 
means for fighting a growing insurgency. 
But by 2012, foreign donors increasingly 
questioned their large investments in civil 
society, often asking a variation of the same 
question: ‘where is Afghan civil society and 
why isn’t it standing up?’ (Interviews with 
EU, US, and UN officials, Kabul and Mazar, 
2011–2012). In explaining this ‘failure of 
civil society’, many officials reverted to 
Afghan stereotypes, often stating in one way 
or another that Afghans lacked the traits that 
allowed others to democratize and develop 
in other countries, and were instead driven 
by Islamic, tribal and sectarian identities 
inconsistent with the creation of a strong 
civil society.
Afghan participants, however, told another 
story and largely faulted external actors for 
their role in ‘corrupting’ society and nour-
ishing a violent political marketplace that 
undermined their ability to resist regressive 
forces manipulating their insecurity. Many 
believed that foreign actors fail to appreciate 
local dynamics of legitimization and power, 
and instead turn to inappropriate and reduc-
tionist cultural frameworks to frame strate-
gies. In particular, external actors focused 
on security are seen as valorising the role 
of tribes or other ‘traditional actors’ with 
little consideration of the realities of a soci-
ety transformed by extreme violence and 
mass migration. When citizens try to lodge 
complaints, or seek support for community 
mobilization, they remain unheard: foreign-
ers speak only to ‘armed actors, government 
officials and English-speaking elites’ while 
the Kabul government is ‘unresponsive, 
like a fortress’ (Interviews and dialogues, 
Jalalabad, 2011). For example, Thomas Ruttig 
(2010: 9–10) notes how some communities 
established councils or committees to pro-
tect against attacks and settle disputes, such 
as the Tribal Solidarity Council, the Dzadran 
Unity Meeting, and the Mangal Central 
Shura, but these were ignored by Kabul and 
foreign actors, which left them isolated and 
vulnerable to the Taliban.
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Moreover, they questioned donor 
approaches to civil society that focused on 
creating professionalized service-delivery 
NGOs, which encouraged rent-seeking and 
discouraged Afghan values of volunteerism 
and unity. ‘NGOs operate as private contrac-
tors’, some argued, ‘competing with one 
another and private enterprises for foreign 
funds’ (Dialogues, Mazar and Kabul, 2011). 
Indeed, many NGOs were created in response 
to funding programs and controlled by polit-
ically-connected individuals. In their view, 
Western-manufactured civil society had been 
captured by elites who claimed to act in the 
public good but instead lined their pockets 
and those of their followers. In response, 
grassroots actors increasingly preferred 
unregistered organizations and networks to 
not only make a distinction between ‘busi-
ness’ NGOs and ‘public interest’ groups but 
also to avoid ‘co-option’ by government and 
international actors. The type of external 
support that would be beneficial, they sug-
gested, was for external actors to scale up 
their protective role, reconsider close alli-
ances with armed and corrupt actors, reduce 
the large volumes of aid and redirect sup-
port to local activities that strengthen links 
between communities, recreate a shared 
sense of purpose and identity, and provide a 
safe space to hold powerbrokers to account.
In this context, reinvigorating civicness 
reveals the need to think through the dynam-
ics of political authority, public security and 
societal disintegration. For many, attaining 
security is less about the introduction of 
more armed groups or security instruments 
but about creating new kinds of civil society 
arrangements that can promote an alterna-
tive vision and organizational framework for 
achieving justice and stability.
Conclusion
In this article, we have shown that the CRP 
framework of public authority, developed 
largely in an African context, can be usefully 
applied to explain the persistence of vio-
lence in the Afghan case. Public authority at 
all levels in Afghanistan is pervaded by the 
logic of the political marketplace – some-
thing that has been fuelled by international 
aid and military intervention. The insecu-
rity and injustice experienced by ordinary 
Afghans has created the basis for the logic 
of moral populism espoused by the Taliban. 
In all parts of Afghanistan, it is also possible 
to identify a logic of civicness but its poten-
tial is constrained by the dominance of the 
other two logics. This theoretical approach 
offers a valuable corrective to the dominant 
approaches in the field, which tend to stress 
either state-building or a focus on the local 
and traditional.
The framework, however, needs to be inte-
grated into a broader framework that consid-
ers the logics of external players. Persistent 
violence can partly be explained in terms of a 
sort of myopia on the part of the international 
community. It can be argued that external 
players fail to take the prevailing logics into 
account because they either believe in the 
construction of a Weberian state or else they 
have somewhat romantic notions about nur-
turing the local and traditional. But equally, 
myopia may be a structural construction; 
external behaviour can also be explained by 
the War on Terror and the fact that for the 
some of the outside actors, the priority is to 
ally with those, usually former mujahedeen 
commanders, who will help them in their 
self-perpetuating goal of killing or capturing 
those considered to be terrorists.
The international community is not, of 
course, monolithic and the CRP framework 
could help to underpin efforts to open-up 
alternative policies. There are those, particu-
larly among the Europeans, who are aiming to 
contribute towards stability for Afghanistan 
and who believe that civil society could help 
them in achieving this goal. Yet our findings 
show that their efforts to support civil soci-
ety usually through funding are obstructed 
by the pervasiveness of the dominant logics. 
Part of the problem is the tendency to view 
civil society in empirical terms as a combi-
nation of groups and associations, rather 
than in terms of the way in which civil soci-
ety can contribute to an alternative logic of 
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civicness. Or put in another way, civil society 
can be interpreted as those who perform a 
pre-figurative politics that could potentially 
provide the kernel of a logic of civicness. On 
this understanding, funding may be posi-
tively harmful, infecting civil society with 
the logic of the political marketplace. Rather, 
what is important is political engagement, 
offering deliberative forums, channels of 
communication and genuine justice mecha-
nisms, that marginalize other ways of doing 
politics whether it is money (the political 
marketplace) or extremist ideology (moral 
populism) and that preserves, sustains and 
extends the sort of politics (civicness) per-
formed by civil society and that could con-
tribute to security.
Notes
 1 The Conflict Research Programme, funded 
by the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID), investigates the 
drivers of conflict in the Middle East and 
Africa. The conceptual framework builds 
on an earlier programme funded by 
DFID, the Justice and Security Research 
Programme (JSRP).
 2 Weber defined the modern state as the 
organisation that successfully upholds 
the monopoly of legitimate violence. He 
explained the modern state as a rational, 
bureaucratic, law based organisation. See 
Weber 1947.
 3 Their worth can be seen in the estimated 
price individuals have paid for provin-
cial level appointments, estimated at 
$50,000–$100,000 by NATO officials 
interviewed (Kabul, July 2011).
 4 For example, events in 2012 like the 
Quran burnings by US soldiers, the video 
of US soldiers urinating on dead Taliban 
members in January, the killing spree by 
a US army officer that left sixteen civilians 
dead in March, combined with unpopular 
night raids and airstrikes, fuel suspicions 
over the ‘anti-Muslim’ intentions of exter-
nal actors.
 5 Detailed findings from field research 
conducted by Theros in 2010–2011 
supported by the French Development 
Agency as part of a larger project on 
Regressive Networks and Globalization 
will be published in a forthcoming 
article.
 6 For detailed history of the Taliban, see e.g. 
Cramer and Goodhand (2002), Edwards 
(2001), Rashid (2001), Shahzad (2011), 
and Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 
(2012).
 7 For more detail on participants and 
methodology used, please see (Theros 
and Kaldor 2011) and (Theros 2012).
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